The demands of war have compelled Israel’s military and political leadership to revise a long list of assumptions that had hamstrung its response to the arc of fire Iran had woven around it. Professor Gabi Siboni, who had sounded the alarm and issued warnings, reflects on the end of the old paradigm.
Since the October 7 massacre, Israel’s leadership has undergone a process of disillusionment that has brought about a dramatic shift in the country’s security doctrine. This shift has yielded a series of remarkable successes. Could a different leadership return to the old assumptions and policies, and thereby produce the same old outcomes? Professor Gabi Siboni, a retired colonel and former head of research programs on military affairs, strategy, and cyber at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), is careful to avoid statements with direct political implications. Instead, he offers a penetrating analysis of the regional transformations that have unfolded over three years of war, leaving readers to draw their own conclusions.
Since the First Lebanon War, when the IDF first found itself confronting non-state organizations rather than armies, Israel has struggled to determine how best to address the new challenge, Professor Siboni explains as he lays out the broader regional picture.
“Since the Islamic Revolution, Iran has been working to build an arc of fire around Israel, the ‘Little Satan.’ Its aim is to establish regional hegemony as a Shiite power seeking to end centuries in which Shiites were regarded as the ‘punching bags’ of Islam, while Sunnis held the dominant position. To this end, Iran has developed two principal arms. The first is its nuclear arm, based on the understanding that attaining the status of a nuclear threshold state with military nuclear capabilities would give it far greater power to advance Iranian policy and threaten other countries.”
Iran’s second arm, Siboni explains, is the arc of fire itself. It begins with Hezbollah and extends through Syria, encompassing the Shiite militias operating there and cooperation with the Alawite regime, which he describes as little more than an offshoot of Shiism. It continues through the Shiite militias in Iraq and, from there, to militias in Saudi Arabia and Yemen. Along the way, Iran exploits the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
“Iran wholeheartedly embraces Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, even though they are Sunni movements, guided by the principle that ‘the enemy of my enemy is my friend.’ Into this volatile mix, the Iranians also draw Arab residents of Judea and Samaria and, wherever possible, elements among Israel’s Arab citizens.”
“The Iranians said that if Israel tried to attack their nuclear facilities, they would unleash hellfire on it through these proxies. If Israel chose not to do so, they would intensify their pursuit of nuclear weapons. From their perspective, they have a target date: 2040, by which they intend to destroy Israel. They could achieve this through an all-out attack that would include nuclear missile strikes against Israel.”
Siboni maintains that for many years, Israel failed to deal effectively with the Iranian proxies tightening their grip around it. One operation after another in Gaza and Lebanon failed to fundamentally alter the threat landscape. In February 2022, Professor Siboni and retired Brigadier General Yuval Bazak published an extensive article titled “A Determined Course,” calling for military action against Iran’s proxies first, followed by a direct focus on Iran itself.
"Until October 7, Israel had failed to find a way to address the challenge in a serious and effective manner. We kept getting bogged down in military operations in Gaza, trading blows with Hezbollah in Lebanon, and conducting the campaign between wars (CBW) in Syria. The latter proved successful in keeping Iranian forces at bay. But this was the situation in which we arrived at October 7, compounded by the conception that we understood Hamas’s intentions and desires, and by the IDF’s desire to contain the threat and get through its watch without incident."
The Painful Day After Which Everything Changed
The devastating blow Israel suffered on the morning of Simchat Torah “forced the political leadership, headed by Netanyahu, to confront the problem head-on. The resulting shift in the security doctrine and in the way Israel responded to threats was extraordinary. A strategy was put into effect that yielded remarkable results. The proxies were dismantled to the point that they no longer posed a substantial threat. Hezbollah was dismantled; the Assad regime was destabilized to such an extent that jihadists were able to enter Damascus and seize control, a development the IDF exploited to dismantle the Syrian army and remove the Iranian presence there. The Houthis were dealt with, even if the job was not completed, and eventually we moved on to Iran. The approach of dealing with the proxies first and Iran afterward proved its worth.”
Siboni cannot say whether, when Netanyahu declared on October 8 that “we will change the face of the Middle East,” he already had this strategy clearly and systematically laid out. In his assessment, however, “Netanyahu intuitively understood that Israel could no longer live with a threat hanging over it like a dark cloud, and he repented. In fact, we were all trapped in the old conception, and I include myself, even though I had written about the problem and warned against it. We can now see that Netanyahu repented and dramatically changed both the security doctrine and the methods of operation. If someone had told us back then that we would reach a point where Iran would be struck, Hezbollah’s positions at Beaufort and Ali al-Taher would be dismantled without Hezbollah responding, and Hamas would be taking blow after blow, we would have said that person was delusional. Yet here we are.”
Professor Siboni explains that the decision to proceed in stages, first targeting the proxies and then the head of the octopus, was also dictated by the constraints facing a small military, particularly its ground forces.
“You cannot keep relying on the same forces over and over again, sending the Alexandroni Brigade back in again and again,” he says. “That is why we operated in Gaza even when the situation in the north was difficult and Hezbollah was intensifying its fire. Later, we shifted the main effort from Gaza to Lebanon, then to Syria, and eventually to Iran in Operation Rising Lion. We must remember that all this took place in the face of fierce opposition from the Biden administration, which acted blatantly to advance its own interests. It did not want us to finish the job in Gaza and Lebanon. The truth is that, even now, the Americans prefer their relations with us and with other countries to be based on a master-servant dynamic. We must resist this.”
“Hamas continues to smuggle weapons despite the fact that we control a significant part of the Gaza Strip and the Philadelphi Corridor. Its members collect unexploded ordnance and rebuild their capabilities, because that is their ethos. It is therefore clear that the time will come when we will have to dismantle Hamas and all the infrastructure it has built above and below ground. We have been there for three years, and there is still a great deal of work to do. This is the largest fortified complex in the world, and it will take several more years to dismantle it all. They will not do it voluntarily.”
The Real Solution to Prevent the Next War: Arab Emigration
But Siboni argues that this is not enough. “Hamas is not the problem in Gaza; it is a symptom of a far more serious problem. The problem is a barbaric mob concentrated in one place and united by a single ethos: the destruction of Israel. If we uproot Hamas, they will produce a new Hamas. That is why all the talk of rebuilding the Strip is devoid of real substance. There is no difficulty in building houses and paving roads, but the underlying ethos of this mob cannot be changed. The only solution, therefore, is the emigration of Gaza’s residents. We need to consider how to bring this about while addressing our domestic and international challenges. But if we do not want our grandchildren to have to fight in Gaza as well, this solution is necessary.”
Returning to the question raised at the outset, could Israel’s dramatic shift in security doctrine still be reversed, perhaps under a different government and leadership with a different outlook? Siboni is careful not to comment on individual politicians, but believes that “after the elections, we will face enormous American pressure to withdraw from Gaza, Lebanon, and Syria. They do not like our presence there. Everyone needs to consider who is best suited to withstand this pressure: Netanyahu or someone else. Each person will decide for themselves, in accordance with their worldview. In my view, the security doctrine Israel has developed—operating beyond the country’s borders, maintaining a permanent presence in those areas, defending beyond the fence in Gaza, Lebanon, and Syria, and eliminating threats while they are still unfolding—is sound and appropriate. It is important that this doctrine not be changed.”
Asked to assess the direction Israel is likely to take over the coming decades, Professor Siboni strikes a balance between caution and optimism.
“Israel is currently facing a number of active fronts, but its security doctrine and overall approach are now proactive. We operate beyond the fence and forge important alliances, including the Abraham Accords and agreements with Greece, Cyprus, and countries in the East.”
“Europe has imposed sanctions that affect the Israeli economy, but there is no need to be alarmed. Past experience has shown that whenever Israel has faced sanctions, it has emerged from the episode stronger. European governments will change, and more Israel-friendly governments will replace them. That is why my outlook for the future is optimistic. Nevertheless, we must remember that we need to address threats such as the one developing in Judea and Samaria. We must also prepare for the possibility that a future American administration could turn against us. This means building these international alliances, strengthening our capabilities, and achieving greater independence in arms production.”