The way Shimon Sheves, who would later serve as Chief of Staff to Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, chose to convince Prime Minister Menachem Begin to apply Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights offers valuable lessons in how to mount a successful campaign and ideological determination.
Sheves was the right-hand man of late Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin during the Oslo era and many on the Right consider him to be a staunch political rival, but in these days of upheaval in Syria, the dramatic political path he forged when he was but 24 years of age, comes to mind along with the implications of that move, which are especially significant these days.
The application of Israeli sovereignty to the Golan Heights, resulting from the campaign he led, prevented the area from falling into the hands of the senior Assad and decades later, it also kept the territory from falling into the hands of the rebels, who right now might very well have been perched on the Golan Heights, dipping their feet into the Sea of Galilee and threatening the communities of the Galilee.
We reached out to Sheves to hear firsthand how a successful campaign for sovereignty is orchestrated and how ordinary citizens can drive such a dramatic political initiative. He smiled, wondering aloud if we intended to draw lessons from those days. We didn’t rule out the possibility. “Why not...” we responded. He chuckled, fully aware of what a right-wing movement like ours might want to learn from him and his experience.
The Concerning Clause in the Camp David Accords
The young Sheves had been elected head of the Golan Settlements Council, succeeding Yehuda Harel, who continued to work with him on both political and settlement-related matters. The Camp David Accords had just been signed, and the residents of the Golan Heights identified a troubling clause in the agreement that Menahem Begin brought to the Knesset for approval.
“The problem with the agreement,” Sheves recalls, “was the distinction it introduced between the territory within borders of the Mandatory Land of Israel and the other territories” During the Camp David negotiations, a contentious debate arose, ultimately resulting in a decision to revert to the pre-Six-Day War lines of June 4, 1967. Talks about autonomy in Judea and Samaria were also agreed upon, and one clause in the agreement stated that the deal could serve as a model for agreements in other areas. This clause was a clear red flag for the Golan Heights residents. “It was evident that this agreement would likely lead to a similar deal with Syria,” Sheves explains.
The fear that the euphoria following the peace agreement with Egypt would make the Golan the next target for concessions drove Sheves and the Golan leadership to act pre-emptively by launching a major campaign.
“We established the Northern Residents’ Council, which brought together not just the Golan leadership but also most of the Galilee regional heads,” Sheves recounts. “We formed a large team of local authorities, which I coordinated. Early on, we launched a major petition, with wording that we designed to build a broad consensus—ranging from Likud leaders who supported sovereignty over the Golan to members of the Labor Party. We drafted the petition in cooperation with the late Yigal Allon, a year before his passing.”
It was not easy to win the support of the Labor Party. “There were fierce debates within the kibbutz movement and other groups affiliated with the Labor Party,” Sheves explains, “but the party’s mainstream supported it.”
“The petition declared that ‘the Golan is an inseparable part of the Land of Israel, and Israel’s sovereignty over it would be a guarantee of peace and security.’ According to the documents, we gathered 745,000 signatures – members of youth movements such as Hashomer Hatza’ir, Bnei Akiva, and HaNo’ar HaOved, along with other volunteers, collected signatures throughout the country over several months. At the campaign’s conclusion, as campaign director and head of the Northern Settlements Committee, I presented the petition to Begin in the Knesset, accompanied by MK Katz-Oz of the Labor Party, who was chairman of the Golan Lobby in the Knesset at the time.
Begin Needed Convincing as Well
While it may seem that the petition would have been accepted easily, convincing Begin was no simple task, Sheves explains, and to secure his support, the petition was bolstered by the signatures of 79 MKs’, who also signed the citizens’ petition. “We met with Begin multiple times and exerted a lot of pressure on him,” Sheves recalls. Then he spoke of a time when even he was surprised by the pace at which the matter was progressing:
“I don’t know if it was only because of us, but at the height of our campaign in December 1981, Begin broke his leg or hip and was confined to a wheelchair. One day, I received a call telling me to come to the Knesset for a discussion on the Golan. I didn’t know what to expect. I travelled to Jerusalem with a few friends, sat in the gallery, and suddenly, Begin stood up and spoke about applying Israeli law to the Golan Heights. That same day, the law passed all three readings.”
Sheves emphasizes the impact of the step, especially because of the international status of the Golan Heights, since it was not within the borders of the Mandatory Land of Israel, and required special legislation to apply Israeli sovereignty.
The dramatic Israeli move sparked international outrage, including from Israel’s staunch ally, the United States. President Reagan suspended strategic talks with Israel, and a flurry of global condemnation followed. But “it didn’t last long”, because six months later, the Lebanon War began, and they had other reasons to criticize us”, Sheves notes, saying that all throughout the campaign, there was awareness that there could be a harsh international response but it was a necessary political decision aimed at differentiating the Golan Heights from the Sinai, where Israel had fully withdrawn to the Green Line. “That’s why Begin applied Israeli law—to dispel any illusions.”
As one may assume, Sheves makes it clear that he does not believe it correct to apply a similar approach to Judea and Samaria. “Not because we do not have rights there—we do,” he clarifies, “but because of the millions of Arabs living in these areas.” And we ask about the Jordan Valley - could a consensus similar to the one he achieved 40 years ago be formed now? Sheves would like to believe it possible but doubts the political feasibility.
“I would like to remind you that in my role at the Defense Ministry, I helped establish ten communities in the Jordan Valley. Listen to Rabin’s speech three weeks before his assassination—he speaks of Israeli sovereignty in the Jordan Valley in the broadest sense of the term. We have a clear ideology regarding the state’s security borders. I support sovereignty in the Jordan Valley, but I don’t think it’s politically feasible to apply sovereignty in the Jordan Valley today.”
The interview was first published in Issue 18 of the Sovereignty Journal. Click here for the issue.