Lt. Col. (Ret.) Yehonatan Dahoah-Halevi researcher and former intelligence officer, discusses the illusions behind attempts to portray Abu Mazen’s Fatah movement as fundamentally different from Hamas – attempts aimed at positioning the PA as a future partner for regional stabilization
From almost day one of the war, voices from Israel’s center-left have been raising questions about the “day after.” They demand immediate answers from the government, and in their absence, they brand the entire campaign a failure. When questioned themselves on this issue, they fall back on advocating for the Palestinian Authority and its leader as a moderate governing alternative for governance in Gaza.
This position finds support in European countries and the outgoing Biden administration, but is there indeed a significant, substantial ideological divide between Fatah, led by Mahmoud Abbas, and Hamas, which perpetrated the October 7th massacre and whose trained, armed terrorists continue to fight IDF soldiers to this day? We posed this question to Lt. Col. (Res.) Yehonatan Dahoah-Halevi, a senior researcher of Middle East and radical Islam at the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs.
Dahoah-Halevi has dedicated many years to studying and researching the sentiments in the Palestinian Authority. His research has informed many top state and military decision-makers, including providing specific warnings regarding scenarios that either materialized or were averted thanks to his warnings. Addressing our questions, he emphasizes his answer is not politically motivated, but is grounded solely in a professional analysis of data and the reality on the ground.
Regarding the various Palestinian organizations and the differences between them, he explains: “There are numerous organizations within the Palestinian landscape, with the most prominent ones being Fatah, which was founded by Yasser Arafat as the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), the Islamic Resistance Movement Hamas, Islamic Jihad in Palestine, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. All the Palestinian organizations share the same fundamental principles centered on the demand for full Palestinian rights without exception, foremost among them, full Israeli withdrawal from the 1967 territories including Jerusalem, the establishment of a sovereign Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital, and the implementation of what Palestinians call the right of return (plus compensation) for the refugees and their descendants to their original places of residence within the territory of sovereign Israel.”
“The primary point of contention among the Palestinian organizations lies in the strategies employed to achieve these objectives. Fatah, which is the support base for the Palestinian Authority established by the PLO, advocates for a combination of diplomacy and legal action, alongside the continued violent struggle, as the most effective means to establish a sovereign Palestinian state, viewing this as a crucial step toward realizing the right of return. In the past, Hamas opposed Fatah’s political strategy; however, following the Al-Aqsa Intifada (the second intifada), there was a gradual shift in Hamas’s position, and it is now willing to engage in diplomatic moves that further these goals, provided it is not required to compromise on its core demands.”
This shift in Hamas’s position, Dahoah-Halevi explains, laid the groundwork for Hamas leader Khaled Mashal’s 2017 political document and a series of Fatah-Hamas agreements that were signed but never implemented. The reason for this lies in the power struggle between Fatah and Hamas over control of the Palestinian national movement.”
“Hamas sought to leverage these agreements to bring about new general elections in the Palestinian Authority, on the assumption that it could secure control of Judea and Samaria and integrate into the PLO institutions. This strategy was aimed at facilitating its complete takeover of this organization, which is recognized internationally as the sole representative of the Palestinian people and the State of Palestine.”
The Withdrawal from Gaza and Northern Samaria as Proof of Success
Further to Hamas’s shift toward political engagement, the Palestinian Authority maintains its position that armed resistance against Israel is a legitimate response to occupation. “From the Palestinians’ perspective, only Israeli citizens and organizations can be classified as terrorists, while no Palestinian individual or group can be deemed terrorists.” notes Dahoah-Halevi.
“The strategy of the Palestinian Authority is based on demonstrating the cost of the occupation, meaning that the struggle against Israel’s presence in Judea and Samaria and Jerusalem aims to burden Israel and extract a heavy price that will ultimately force it to withdraw unconditionally. From the PA’s perspective, the Al-Aqsa Intifada validated this approach, resulting in Israel’s unconditional withdrawal from all of Gaza and portions of northern Samaria. Consequently, the Palestinian Authority engages in a dual narrative regarding terrorism. For external consumption, it professes its opposition to terror and claims to be committed to combating it, while simultaneously endorsing what it calls popular resistance against the occupation, such as protests, riots, violent confrontations, stone-throwing, Molotov cocktails, shooting attacks, IEDs, etc. In addition, the Palestinian Authority provides an economic safety net for those involved in perpetrating terrorist attacks against Jews by providing monthly allowances for families of shaheeds, security prisoners, and individuals wounded while carrying out such attacks. The Palestinian Authority regards these monthly allowances as a supreme and sacred obligation.”
“The security chaos in Judea and Samaria benefits the Palestinian Authority, because it targets Israel and exemplifies the significant cost associated with the occupation, while claiming no involvement in it,” explains Dahoah-Halevi. Referring to conflicts in recent weeks, especially in Jenin between Fatah and Hamas members, he says that these serve the PA’s desire to portray itself as worthy of leadership and governance in Gaza, and to this end, has recruited international actors to label it as such.
For those who believe that the establishment of a Palestinian state would give the Palestinians grounds to declare an end to the conflict, Dahoah-Halevi notes, “There is a Palestinian consensus that the conflict won’t end until all the rights of the Palestinian people have been restored, including the right of return. According to this approach, the establishment of a Palestinian state is unlikely to bring an end to the conflict. Terrorist organizations have carried out shooting attacks against Israeli settlements along the Green Line in recent years and continue to do so. In northern Samaria, Hamas operatives have engaged in training exercises simulating infiltration and assaults on Israeli settlements. From Hamas’s perspective, Judea and Samaria hold greater strategic significance than Gaza, due to their geographic domination of Israel’s center. They believe that these territories provide a vantage point for monitoring and potentially defeating Israel in military operations from these territories. The October 7th attack serves as a source of inspiration for the Palestinian organizations in Judea and Samaria.”
The interview was first published in Issue 18 of the Sovereignty Journal. Click here for the issue.