The application of sovereignty over Judea and Samaria and taking control of the Gaza Strip will remove the Palestinian sword from our neck, but to do this, we must first weed out those who are responsible for the failure”. Aryeh Eldad | Ma’ariv
To read the original Hebrew article
For many years, too many years, Israel has avoided a strategic resolution of the Palestinian issue. Peace agreements with Egypt included – in keeping with the Egyptian demand – an attempt to solve “the conflict” in the framework of “discussions on autonomy”, which quickly led to a dead end. There are those who say that Menahem Begin understood the great danger of such autonomy, and quashed the discussions.
The Oslo Accords, which were another attempt to reach a solution, ended in a terrible bloodbath. More than 1,500 Jews were murdered as a result of bringing Yassir Arafat into the country and establishing the PA. The majority of the Israeli public became clear opponents of establishing a Palestinian state following the second intifada, but Benjamin Netanyahu, Arik Sharon, Ehud Olmert and Naftali Bennett, even when they had endless opportunities to do so – refrained from dismantling the PA.
Sharon’s attempt to come to a unilateral resolution with the “Disengagement”, created a dangerous terror realm that we have find difficult to defeat. We consumed its rotten fruits on October 7. The illusion that we would be able to keep the terror burning on a low flame for years, continue to manage the conflict without resolution and ignore it – also collapsed in the Simchat Torah massacre.
It was not laziness or lack of imagination that prevented Israel from a clear resolution. On one hand – it is clear to the most Israelis and their representatives in the national camp that establishing a Palestinian state in the territories of Judea and Samaria or even in parts of it, will present an existential danger to the state of Israel. Most Israelis understand that beyond the border of that state will not be a peace-loving neighbor seeking co-existence, but one that strives – and even declares this openly – to destroy us.
All those in Western cities and their universities these days, screaming “From the river to the sea – Palestine will be free” are actually echoing the Hamas Charter. 75% of the Arabs of Judea and Samaria support Hamas and its acts on October 7. Therefore, the establishment and recognition of a Palestinian state – the “two-states” idea held by the U.S. and most of Europe – is not at all an option for Israel.
On the other hand, resolution in the other direction: the application of Israeli sovereignty over the territories of Judea and Samaria, can be expected to encounter vigorous opposition from most of the world’s countries. Fear of this opposition and its ramifications (for instance, crippling sanctions) have caused Israeli governments over the years to vacillate between the two alternatives of “on one hand” and “on the other hand”, and to hope that we would succeed to manage the conflict without resolving it.
But ironically, it was the severe blow that we received on the 7th of October brought back the demand to establish and recognize a Palestinian state to the international discussion table. Not despite the savage atrocities of Hamas – but because of them. The world respects those who are strong and victorious. At first, everyone was “on our side” and expected the destruction of Hamas. When this failed to materialize, the Western world understood that Israel is not succeeding to achieve the goals of its war.
And just as, 90 years ago, they tried to placate Adolf Hitler by sacrificing Czechoslovakia – they are now trying to pacify Palestinian terror and its Iranian masters. It is not the tens of thousands of Gazans that were killed that bothers them, but the lack of military victory and the fear of regional conflagration. If we had had a quick victory – they would have applauded us. But now, several European countries are promising to recognize a Palestinian state.
Therefore, strategic victory is vital. Here and now.
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The application of Israeli sovereignty over the territories of the Land of Israel west of the Jordan is the only strategic resolution that will remove the Palestinian sword from our neck – but it will not end the conflict. The war between us and them is a religious war, and as such, is liable to continue many hundreds of years. Terror will not disappear, but such sovereignty will remove the existential danger looming over our longest land-border. Then entire Land could become like the Gaza envelope on the morning of October 7th if we do not maintain an army of tens of thousands permanently, for the entire length of the border, because if, Heaven forbid, such a sovereign “state” is established, we would not have the ability to enter its territory every night, to carry out a raid in Jenin, Nablus or Tul Karem in order to “mow the grass”.
Many of those who oppose applying Israeli sovereignty (as we applied in Jerusalem of the Golan Heights) claim that we cannot bear the burden of welfare and education and healthcare and infrastructure for millions of hostile Arabs. Various research has shown that during the period that we ruled the entire area (from the Six Day War until the Oslo Accords), the economic burden was negligible compared with the amount of money that Israel has invested in the war on terror in the area of the PA and by entrenching ourselves behind all sorts of walls and other barriers.
Others attribute their opposition to not wanting “to hold a foreign people under occupation”. This claim ignores, of course, that the People of Israel cannot be an occupier in its own homeland, as well as the possibility of having a municipal autonomy, as were established in Judea and Samaria before we lost our minds and made Arafat their king.
Even in the first government meeting dealing with the fate of “the territories” in June of 1967, Menahem Begin cautioned that “Autonomy inevitably leads to statehood” – and despite this, he did not constrain himself from committing to autonomy in the framework of the Camp David Peace Agreements with Egypt. On this issue, it should be made clear that autonomy, which derives its authority from the mother-country (like the Basque autonomy in Spain) is not dangerous, because Spain can prevent the Basques from establishing an army any time they want, for example.
In contrast, autonomy that derives its authority external to the mother-state, for example, an international agreement with external guarantors, becomes an entity that Israel would have no control over. For example, the Palestinian “autonomy” that was established following the Oslo Accords, which derives its authorities from the agreement. And even if there are restrictions – Israel would not be able to prevent the Palestinian educational system from becoming a production line for terrorists and its security mechanisms into terror organizations.
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To reach the strategic resolution that we require, Israel must pass through several phases before the application of sovereignty: total victory over Hamas, controlling the entire Gaza Strip, everything included – and disconnecting from Egypt by controlling the Philadelphia Strip – these are the necessary conditions. And every day without achieving this goal weakens Israel extremely, and strengthens those who demand the establishment of a Palestinian state. A war with Hizb’Allah will be required if we want to stop Iran at the border of Lebanon and not over the skies of Tel Aviv.
In order to achieve these security goals a comprehensive reform of the IDF, the Shin Bet and the Mossad is required. It is not reasonable for the chief of staff who was in office during the October 7th debacle to appoint the generals of the next General Staff, without the civilian systems having the opportunity to weed out the advocates of the failed concept. I read that the Chief of Staff wants to appoint Brig. Gen. Shlomi Binder to be the next head of Intelligence. Binder is an excellent officer – we have very few like him. But he was head of the head of the Operations Division of the General Staff, therefore, he also has some responsibility for the failure of operations on the 7th of October.
On the other hand, I have read that Netanyahu wants the next head of intelligence to be Major General Eliezer Toledano, an excellent officer and a hero, who was his military secretary – and therefore, tainted by politics – and he was also a commander of the Southern Command, and a full partner to the concept.
Which is better? Which of them is still tied to the concept? I don’t know. It could be that they are both very suitable. But since, as I understand it, the next Chief of Staff must not be a clone of the present chief of staff, and Netanyahu, a senior partner of the debacle, has already proven himself as one who does not know how to choose suitable candidates – Israel must invent a new mechanism as quickly as possible: The chief of staff will make a recommendation, the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee will conduct an in-depth hearing behind closed doors and will, by secret vote, approve or disapprove a candidate.
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These are all necessary, but not sufficient, conditions. In order to arrive at strategic resolution of the kind that we require – there must be a leader who wants it and is capable of doing it. Netanyahu is not that person.